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Faced with a choice between JohnMcCain and Barack Obama, voters in 2008 were swayed by the familiar play of factors—
party identification, policy preferences, and economic conditions—but also, we find, by ethnocentrism, a deep-seated
psychological predisposition that partitions the world into ingroups and outgroups—into “us” and “them.” The effect of
ethnocentrism was significant and substantial, and it appeared over and above the effects due to partisanship, economic
conditions, policy stances, political engagement, and several varieties of conservatism. Two features of Obamawere primarily
responsible for triggering ethnocentrism in 2008: his race and his imagined Muslim faith. As such, we demonstrate that
ethnocentrism was much more important in 2008 than in the four presidential elections immediately preceding 2008, and
we show that it was much more important in the actual contest between Senator McCain and Senator Obama than in a
hypothetical contest between Senator McCain and Senator Clinton.
Inmany ways, voters in the 2008 American presiden-tial election faced a familiar scene. As always, thetwo major parties nominated men. Prior to their
nominations, both candidates had held responsible lead-
ership positions. Both recruited expert and experienced
staffs. Both spent an astonishing amount of money in
pursuit of votes. And, for the most part, both focused
their campaigns on important issues: peace, prosperity,
health care, and more. All of this follows a familiar script.
At the same time, the 2008 election also presented Amer-
icans with something new: a candidate who broke utterly
with tradition; a candidate who we think provoked many
Americans to question whether he was really “one of us.”
We are speaking here, of course, about Barack
Obama. Obama was different. First of all, he was black—
or at least he was taken to be black. His father was African,
born and raised in Kenya. His mother grew up on a farm
in Iowa—what could bemore normal than that!—but be-
came an anthropologist and (worse yet) a cosmopolitan.
Obama spent his early years in exotic settings: Hawaii and
then Indonesia. Many Americans wondered (and even at
this writing still wonder) whether he is a citizen of the
United States. Some believed him to be a Muslim. His
very name—Barack Hussein Obama—was disturbing.
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In some ways real, in some ways imagined, Obama
was perceived by many Americans to be different. The
purpose of our article is to demonstrate that this percep-
tion of difference operated as a powerful short-term force
in the 2008 election. More precisely, we intend to show
that opposition to Obama in 2008 was driven, in part, by
ethnocentrism.
By ethnocentrism we refer to a deep-seated psycho-
logical predisposition that partitions the world into in-
groups and outgroups—into “us” and “them.” Symbols,
values, and practices become objects of attachment and
pride when they belong to the ingroup, and they become
objects of condescension, contempt, and in extreme cases,
hatred when they are seen to belong to outgroups. De-
fined this way, ethnocentrism is an ancient phenomenon,
but it is a modern word, invented at the opening of the
twentieth century by William Graham Sumner. In Folk-
ways ([1906] 2002), Sumner set out a bold conjecture:
that members of all human groups believe that their way
of doing things (their folkways) are superior to the way
things are done elsewhere. “Ethnocentrism,” as Sumner
called it, is the “technical name for this view of things in
which one’s own group is the center of everything” (1906,
12).
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Sumnerwas convinced that ethnocentrismwas a uni-
versal feature of human society, and he was not far from
wrong. Everywhere we look, outsiders are greeted with
suspicion and animosity. Around the world, ethnocen-
trism prevails (Brewer and Campbell 1976; Kinder and
Kam 2009).
But if ethnocentrism is ubiquitous—if, as John
Higham declares, “no age or society seems wholly free
from unfavorable opinions on outsiders” (1955, 3)—
ethnocentrism as a concept in political analysis has been,
until recently, all but invisible. Ethnocentrism is hard to
find in contemporary social science theorizing, and it
is especially hard to find in empirical studies of Ameri-
can elections and public opinion (Kinder and Kam 2009;
LeVine 2001).
We think this a mistake and have done our best to
correct it (Kinder and Kam 2009). In previous work we
have shown that ethnocentrism is pervasive in modern
American society; that Americans differ—reliably and
stably—in the degree to which they approach the so-
cial world from an ethnocentric point of view; and that
this one difference has far-reaching consequences for the
positions Americans take on important matters of policy.
Providing for the national defense, dealing harshly with
enemies abroad, withholding assistance to foreign lands
in need, stemming the tide of immigration, pushing back
against gay rights, cutting welfare, and putting an end to
affirmative action: in all these cases, ethnocentrism plays
an independent, significant, and sizable role (Kinder and
Kam 2009). We expect the same will be true in the 2008
election: that ethnocentrism will play an independent,
significant, and sizable role in motivating opposition to
Obama.
For empirical analysis, we rely primarily on two
sources of evidence. First and foremost is the 2008 Amer-
ican National Election Study (ANES), based on face-to-
face interviews with a representative sample of American
adult citizens.Wealsodrawon theCooperativeCampaign
Analysis Project (CCAP), a national panel study of regis-
tered voters, conducted online in six waves, commencing
inDecemberof 2007andconcluding inNovemberof 2008
immediately after the presidential election. Throughout,
our analysis concentrates onwhites, as support forObama
among black Americans was virtually unanimous.1
1In the 2008 ANES, of the 413 blacks who said that they voted for
one of the two major candidates in the presidential election, 411
(99.5%) reported voting for Obama. For details on study design of
the 2008 ANES, see http: //www.electionstudies.org. CCAP was a
joint venture of research teams from 38 universities. Participating
teams of researchers gained access to a set of common questions
(Common Content) asked on all waves of all respondents (N of
approximately 36,000), and to specialized questions of their own
In the first section of the article, we develop the idea
of ethnocentrism, spell out how ethnocentrism should be
measured, and build a reliable measure out of materials
provided by the 2008ANES.With an adequatemeasure in
hand, we then ascertain the relationship between ethno-
centrism and the 2008 vote.We find, as expected, a strong
and robust connection between the two—opposition to
Obama among white Americans does indeed derive im-
portantly from ethnocentrism—and we show that mul-
tiple efforts to explain away the connection between eth-
nocentrism and Obama are unavailing. Next, we probe
deeper into the meaning of ethnocentrism in 2008, first
by grappling with the distinction between ethnocentrism
and racism, and then doing the same with the distinction
between ethnocentrism and religious intolerance. In the
final empirical section, we discuss conditions for the ac-
tivation of ethnocentrism in 2008, and we demonstrate,
as predicted, that ethnocentrism plays a more important
role in 2008 than in recent presidential elections, and a
more important role in the contest between McCain and
Obama than in a hypothetical contest between McCain
and Hillary Clinton. In the conclusion of the article, we
recapitulate our findings, draw out their implications,
and suggest how, despite ethnocentrism’s importance in
2008, Obama managed to win.
Ethnocentrism in 2008
Ethnocentrism divides the world into two opposing
camps. From an ethnocentric point of view, groups are
either “friend” or they are “foe,” eliciting loyalty and fa-
voritism on the one hand or suspicion and disdain on
the other. Ethnocentrism is commonly expressed through
stereotypes. Stereotypes capture, or rather seem to cap-
ture, the characteristics that define a group, that set it
apart from others. Most often, such characteristics have
to do with underlying dispositions—temperament, intel-
ligence, trustworthiness—the deep core of human nature
(Allport [1954] 1989; Fiske 1998).
To measure ethnocentrism expressed in terms of
stereotypes, we draw upon a battery of questions orig-
inally developed by the National Opinion Research Cen-
ter at the University of Chicago and included in the 2008
ANES. In these questions, survey respondents are pre-
sented with a series of paired antonyms—hard-working
versus lazy—and asked to judge whether members of
devising (Team Modules), asked on some waves of some respon-
dents. Interviews were conducted online with registered voters,
selected by YouGovPolimetrix’s sample matching process (Rivers
2006).
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some designated group—whites—are mostly hardwork-
ing, mostly lazy, or somewhere in between. After being
asked to judge whites on this score, respondents are asked
tomake the same judgment, this time about blacks, Asian
Americans, and Hispanic Americans, in randomized or-
der. The procedure is then repeated for a second dimen-
sion: intelligent versus unintelligent. These questions suit
our purposes well. Moral character and intellectual ca-
pacity are central features of stereotypes in general (e.g.,
Fiske 1998; Stangor and Lange 1994), and claims of in-
group superiority are often expressed in just these terms
(Brewer and Campbell 1976).
Based on answers to these questions, we created a
scale of ethnocentrism, E. We scored E to range from
−1 to +1. A “perfect” score of +1 means that on both
traits, “nearly all” members of the ingroup are believed
to be virtuous, and “nearly all” members of all outgroups
are believed to be virtue-less. A score of +1 is perfect in
the sense that it represents an extreme form of ethnocen-
trism. A score of−1 is equally perfect, but in the opposite
direction: −1 represents a topsy-turvy world in which
outgroups are seen as virtuous and ingroups as utterly
without virtue. An overall score of 0, finally, indicates an
absence of ethnocentrism; that on average, ingroups and
outgroups are indistinguishable.2
Figure 1 presents the distribution of E among white
Americans in 2008. As indicated there, ethnocentrism
scores follow the familiar bell-shaped curve reasonably
well. Figure 1 also reveals that the American public is on
balance ethnocentric: first, the curve is displaced away
from the neutral point to the right, in the ethnocentric
direction; and second, the curve is asymmetric, sloping
downward less precipitously to the right, toward the eth-
nocentric point of view.3
Figure 1 reveals what might be called mild ethno-
centrism. On the one hand, ingroup favoritism is com-
mon.On the other hand, ingroup favoritism is restrained.
2The stereotype questions were asked twice, once in the pre-
election interview (self-administered) and once in the postelec-
tion interview (administered by the interviewer). The items are
V083207a–V083208d in the preelection and V085174a–V085175d
in the postelection. The preelection and postelection scales are
equally reliable (preelection,  = 0.77; postelection,  = 0.81).
The correlation between the preelection and postelectionmeasures
(uncorrected formeasurement error) is 0.52. Thepaired t-test com-
paring preelection E and postelection E was not significant (p ∼
0.8). We averaged responses to the preelection and postelection
waves to create our measure of ethnocentrism. For each wave, the
formula for building the primary measure of ethnocentrism is:
E = {(Trait1 ingroup score – Trait1 average outgroup score)
+ (Trait2 ingroup score – Trait2 average outgroup score)}/2
3E is centered at 0.06, with standard deviation of 0.13. It ranges
from –0.54 to +0.71.
FIGURE 1 Ethnocentrism amongWhite
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Source: 2008 American National Election Study.
No one is prepared to claim categorical superiority: that
members of their group are uniformly intelligent and
hardworking, while members of all other groups are uni-
formly stupid and lazy. What we have here is a sense of
gentle superiority, widely shared.
Ethnocentrism and the 2008 Vote
We know that as a general matter, voters in U.S. presiden-
tial elections are motivated by partisanship, policy, and
assessment of national conditions. Surely this would be
so in 2008. No doubt Obama gained and lost votes be-
cause he was a Democrat; gained and lost votes because
of the positions he took on major policy matters; gained
and lost (mostly gained) votes because of the condition
of the country. The multinomial logit results in the first
column of Table 1 confirm that these factors all played an
important role in the 2008 vote.4
4Our dependent variable has three categories: abstained (21.7%
of white respondents), voted for Obama (34.6%), or voted for
McCain (43.7%). In this analysis, we coded Partisanship (V083097)
from −1 (strong Republican) to 1 (strong Democrat). Policy Po-
sitions are coded from −1 (conservative) to +1 (liberal). It is a
scale based on respondents’ answers to four questions of long-
standing importance: the trade-off between services and spending,
whether government has an obligation to provide a standard of
living and jobs to all, defense spending, and government health
care. The services and spending question (V083105 andV083108x)
and the defense spending question (V083112 and V083115x) were
administered with split-sample designs, in which half of the sample
received the standard7-point response scale and theotherhalf of the
sample received a series of branching questions. The government
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TABLE 1 Ethnocentrism and Voting against
Obama in 2008
Vote Choice ANES CCAP
Ethnocentrism 2.52∗∗∗ 2.89∗∗∗
0.86 0.36
Party Identification −3.15∗∗∗ –2.62∗∗∗
0.23 0.08
Policy Positions −1.42∗∗∗ −2.07∗∗∗
0.32 0.09
Assessment of National 0.80∗ 1.55∗∗∗
Economic Conditions 0.44 0.17
Education −0.19 −1.10∗∗∗
0.96 0.18




Assessment of Household −0.08 0.01




p> 2 0.00 0.00
N 909 7229
Column 1: Table entry is the MNL coefficient with standard error
below.
Column2: Table entry is the logistic coefficient with standard error
below.
∗p< 0.1, ∗∗p< 0.05, ∗∗∗p< 0.01.
Full results for theMNLmodel are available in the online appendix.
Source: 2008 American National Election Study (ANES) and
Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (CCAP), as noted.
standard-of-living question (V083128) and the government health
care question (V083119) were administered to one-half of the sam-
ple. In the issue scale that we create, we take the average of all
available responses, provided that the respondent answered at least
two of the four questions. “Don’t Know” and “Haven’t thought
about it” responses are set to the midpoint. The additive issue scale
has  = 0.62. When we include the issue items individually, we
lose a substantial number of cases, but the direction and statistical
significance of the results are unchanged. Assessment of National
Economic Conditions is scaled to range from −1 (much worse) to
+1 (muchbetter) and ismeasured throughanadditive indexofhow
the nation’s economy, national unemployment rate, and national
inflation rate have done in the past year (V083083x, V083087x,
V083089x), with Cronbach’s  = 0.56. Education represents years
of schooling, ranging from 0 (0 years) to 1 (17 years). Political
Information is an additive scale comprised of three institutional
questions asking about which party is more conservative, which
party controlled the House, and which party controlled the Senate
(V085119/a, V085066,V085067). The scale has= 0.66 and ranges
from 0 (none correct) to 1 (all correct). Female is a dummy variable
based on V081101, coded 1 for females. Assessment of Household
Economic Conditions is derived from V083057x, coded from −1
As expected, party identification shaped the vote
more than any other single factor: Democrats were very
likely to vote for Obama while Republicans were very
likely to vote for McCain. Policy positions mattered in
a big way as well, with liberals moving to Obama and
conservatives moving to McCain. The condition of the
economy also contributed: those who believed economic
conditions to be worsening were more likely to sign up
for change; economic optimists stayed with McCain. All
of this is completely familiar and is documented in exist-
ing research on the 2008 election (e.g., Lewis-Beck and
Nadeau 2009; Pasek et al. 2009).
What is new in Table 1 is that, taking standard ex-
planations into account in 2008, ethnocentrism matters
as well. White voters who scored high on the ethnocen-
trism scale were much more likely to vote against Obama
thanwere white voters who scored low on ethnocentrism.
In the 2008 ANES sample of white voters, scores on the
ethnocentrism scale range from –0.5 on the low end to
+0.7 on the high end. Across this range, the predicted
probability of voting against Obama rises sharply, from
0.46 to 0.88, respectively.5
Ethnocentrism did not affect all voters in the same
way, though. The effect of ethnocentrism on voting
(much worse) to +1 (much better). Here and throughout, we rely
on unweighted regression analysis. Analyseswithweights yield sub-
stantively similar results.
Full results (predicting abstention) from theMNLmodel are avail-
able in the online appendix. The Hausman test for IIA (estimated
via seemingly unrelated regression) provided support for the use
of MNL in this case. The coefficients on the full model (with all
three options) were not statistically distinguishable from the two
versions of the constrained model (omitting one of the three op-
tions), at p< 0.05. If we set aside those who abstained in 2008
and estimate vote with logit, we obtain substantively and statis-
tically similar results. And, throughout, when we included con-
trols for age and its square, the results for ethnocentrism were
unchanged.
5The predictions set Female to a value of 1 and all of the other
variables to their means. Now, we could have said that as ethnocen-
trism increased, McCain’s prospects soared. We focus on Obama,
because we’ve been assuming that the significant role played by
ethnocentrism in the 2008 election has to do with Obama, not
McCain. This seems to be so. Respondents to the 2008 ANES were
asked to rate Obama andMcCain (on the thermometer scale) both
before the election and afterwards. To form a dependent variable
for this analysis, we averaged the two evaluations (before and after).
Obama’s mean score on the 0–100-point thermometer rating scale
was 56.0; McCain’s was 55.3. In a regression analysis, controlling
for all of the variables in Table 1, ethnocentrism has a strong and
significant effect on ratings of Obama (b = –27.14, s.e. = 5.11,
p< 0.01) and no effect at all on ratings of McCain (b = 5.92,
s.e. = 4.45). Insofar as ethnocentrism enters into the 2008 vote, it
did so by shapinghowwhiteAmericans think aboutBarackObama,
not how they think about John McCain. We will have more to say
about this, below, when we compare white Americans’ responses to
hypothetical matchups between McCain and Obama and between
McCain and Clinton.
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Source: 2008 American National Election Study.
against Obama can be seen more clearly in Figure 2,
where we display the predicted vote for Obama as a
function of ethnocentrism, when its effect is estimated
separately for Democrats, Independents, and Republi-
cans.6 As revealed there, the effect of ethnocentrism is
most pronounced among Independents; less dramatic but
still potent among Democrats; and fades away among
Republicans. In 2008, Republicans voted overwhelm-
ingly for Senator McCain regardless of their ethnocen-
tric inclinations. But among Democrats and Indepen-
dents, as ethnocentrism increased, Obama’s prospects
plummeted.
The importance of ethnocentrism in the 2008 vote is
confirmed in a second and entirely independent test.Here
we draw on data from the CCAP, the online panel study of
registered voters during the 2008 campaign. Key for our
purposes, the September 2008 wave of CCAP included
instrumentation that allows us to build a good measure
of ethnocentrism.7 The CCAP results, shown in column 2
of Table 1, reveal that, just as we saw with NES data,
6We reestimate the model in Table 1, separately for Democrats,
Independents, and Republicans. MNL estimates for the effect of
ethnocentrism were as follows: b = 2.73 (s.e. = 1.38, p< 0.05) for
Democrats, b = 4.09 (s.e. = 1.26, p< 0.01) for Independents, and
b = –0.20 (s.e. = 2.14, ns) for Republicans. The predictions in
Figure 2 set Female to a value of 1 and all of the other variables to
their means.
7E is based on two trait evaluations (hardworking vs. lazy; intelli-
gent vs. unintelligent) applied to four groups (whites, blacks, His-
panics, and Asians; scap718w/b/a/h, scap719w/b/a/h). For white
respondents, E is centered on 0.04 with standard deviation of 0.14
and Cronbach’s  = 0.80. Partisanship (scap8) is derived from the
September wave as well. For Policy Positions, we create a two-item
ethnocentrismhada strong, independent, and statistically
significant effect on the 2008 vote.8
This strong connection between ethnocentrism and
opposition to Obama, appearing in two independent
tests, also shows up across alternative specifications and
alternative measures. These additional tests, all based on
the 2008 ANES, appear in Table 2. The first column
presents results from a simple replication of the vote
model, but with vote replaced by the thermometer score
rating ofObama. (We carry out these additional tests with
the thermometer rating because it offers a more sensitive
measure than vote.) As the first column shows, ethno-
centrism has a large negative effect on Obama’s rating, as
expected.
The second column of Table 2 entertains the possibil-
ity that white opposition to Obama in 2008 was rooted,
in part, in principle. White Americans might have said
no to Obama not so much because they experienced
him as different, but because they saw him as advocat-
ing a bigger, more intrusive government. Or, they might
have voted against him because they saw him as a radical
egalitarian bent on spreading the wealth. Obama did in
fact advocate an expansion of government programs, and
he did in fact push for progressive tax policies. It would
not be surprising to discover that, when faced with a
choice between Obama and McCain, voters in 2008 were
influenced by their views on government and equality.
Nor would it be all that surprising to discover that the
effect we have so far attributed to ethnocentrism belongs,
in part, to principles.9
Fortunately, good and reliable measures of Ameri-
cans’ views on government and on equality were included
index based on guaranteed jobs (ocap1104) and health insurance
(scap20) ( = 0.73). National and Household Economic Assess-
ments are derived from ocap9 and ocap1100, respectively. We also
control for Political Information (a 10-item indexwith= 0.85, de-
rived from profile101–110) and Education (profile57), and include
a dummy for Female (profile54). All items are coded similarly to
how they are in the ANES analysis.
8The CCAP sample is drawn from registered voters (as opposed
to the ANES sample, which selects eligible voters). Over 96% of
CCAP respondents reported turning out to vote. Hence, with the
CCAPdata,weuse logistic analysis to analyze preference forObama
versus McCain. Multinomial logit (with inclusion of the tiny base
category for abstainers) produced nearly identical results. These
are unweighted regression analyses. Weighted analyses produced
similar results. As with the ANES, the CCAP analyses also suggest
that the effect of ethnocentrism is greatest among Independents,
sizable among Democrats, and smallest among Republicans.
9On the power of principles to shape contemporary public opin-
ion, see Feldman (1988), Kinder and Sanders (1996), and Markus
(2001).
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TABLE 2 The Effect of Ethnocentrism on Opposition to Obama Is Robust to Alternative
Specifications andMeasures
Baseline Adding Adding E∗ based E∗ based
Model Values Authoritarianism on Race on Religion
Ethnocentrism −27.14∗∗∗ −23.73∗∗∗ −23.45∗∗∗ −16.63∗∗∗ −24.17∗∗∗
5.11 5.06 5.24 3.62 3.56
Party Identification 20.63∗∗∗ 18.34∗∗∗ 20.06∗∗∗ 20.84∗∗∗ 19.27∗∗∗
1.13 1.15 1.14 1.09 1.27
Policy Positions 13.17∗∗∗ 7.91∗∗∗ 12.76∗∗∗ 12.84∗∗∗ 12.66∗∗∗
1.81 1.90 1.81 1.78 2.13
Assessment of National −8.28∗∗∗ −6.92∗∗∗ −8.63∗∗∗ −8.07∗∗∗ −8.56∗∗∗
Economic Conditions 2.54 2.48 2.54 2.44 2.89
Education −0.53 0.06 −4.53 0.85 −5.91
5.29 5.20 5.43 5.03 6.25
Political Information 2.18 3.15∗ 1.51 2.04 3.19
1.91 1.89 1.92 1.89 2.23
Female 0.20 −0.27 −0.22 0.56 0.46
1.33 1.29 1.33 1.30 1.53
Assessment of Household 4.84∗∗ 5.40∗∗ 4.20∗ 4.02∗ 5.63∗∗







Intercept 50.94 43.27 59.01 49.64 57.57
4.60 5.05 5.30 4.42 5.59
p> F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adjusted R2 0.46 0.49 0.47 0.46 0.47
N 936 931 935 991 703
Table entry is the OLS coefficient with standard error below.
Dependent variable is the thermometer score rating, which ranges from 0 (cold) to 100 (warm).
∗p< 0.1, ∗∗p< 0.05, ∗∗∗p< 0.01.
Source: 2008 American National Election Study.
in the 2008 ANES.10 When we added both to the baseline
model, we discovered that there appears to be something
to the argument that opposition to Obama was rooted
in principle. White Americans who placed a relatively
low priority on the place of equality in American soci-
ety tended to vote against Obama, as did those who were
worried over the size and scope of government. But the
key point for our purposes is this: taking equality and
limited government into account makes virtually no dent
10Egalitarianism is comprised of an additive index of responses
to V085162–V085167 ( = 0.70), coded from 0 (not egalitar-
ian) to 1 (egalitarian). Limited Government is a three-item scale
(V085105–V085107) with = 0.70, coded from 0 (like more gov-
ernment) to 1 (like limited government).
in the estimated effect of ethnocentrism (see column 2 of
Table 2).
What about authoritarianism? Authoritarians are
distinguished by their predisposition to submit to estab-
lished authorities and to support violence against targets
sanctioned by such authorities (Stenner 2005). As such,
authoritarians might have been drawn to McCain and
Palin in 2008, who were much clearer in articulating the
view that theworld remains a verydangerousplace.More-
over, authoritarianism and ethnocentrism are correlated:
by valuing uniformity and authority over autonomy and
diversity, authoritarians come “naturally” to ethnocen-
trism (Kinder and Kam 2009; Stenner 2005). Perhaps the
story we have been telling about ethnocentrism would be
better recast as a story about authoritarianism.
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Apparently not. When the standard measure of au-
thoritarianism11 is added to our baseline model, the
effect due to ethnocentrism barely budges (shown in
column 3 of Table 2). Opposition to Obama arises pri-
marily from ethnocentrism, not authoritarianism.
Wehaveargued that thebestway to conceiveof ethno-
centrism is as a form of stereotyping, and the best way to
measure ethnocentrism is through stereotypes. Accord-
ingly, our principal measure of ethnocentrism, the one
we have relied on so far, is based upon Americans’ beliefs
about the characteristic attributes of social groups—on
their stereotypes. However, given the inevitable fallibility
ofmeasurement, it is alwaysprudent todevelopadditional
measures whenever possible. With multiple measures, it
is possible to check the robustness of results, to make sure
that results are not a product of some undiscovered and
unimagined defect of measurement. Hence we created an
alternative and second-best measure of ethnocentrism,
drawingon theANES0–100-point “feeling thermometer”
scale. Designed to serve as a general-purpose measure of
political evaluation, the thermometer scale asks respon-
dents to rate a series of prominent political and social
groups. Counted among these groups in 2008 are whites,
blacks, Asian Americans, and Hispanic Americans. The
thermometer scale taps emotional aspects of ethnocen-
trism more directly than does the stereotype battery, but
the parallel in measurement between the two is otherwise
close.12
This second-best measure (call it E∗) is also scored
to range from −1 to +1. As before, +1 means that the
ingroup is rated very warmly and all outgroups are rated
very coldly, 0 indicates that on average, ingroup and out-
groups elicit indistinguishable feelings, and −1 means
that all outgroups are rated very warmly while the in-
group is rated very coldly. 13 When we substitute E∗ for E,
we find that while the estimated effect of ethnocentrism is
reduced, it remains in absolute and relative terms a strong
and significant predictor of opposition toObama (shown
in column 4 of Table 2).
11Authoritarianism is based on responses to v085158–61. The
scale ranges from 0 (not authoritarian) to 1 (authoritarian), with
= 0.59.
12The thermometer score items are V085065c, V085064y,
V085064a, and V085064v for evaluations of whites, blacks,
Hispanics, and Asians, respectively. E∗ = feeling thermometer rat-
ing for whites − average feeling thermometer rating for blacks,
Hispanics, and Asians.
13E∗ is highly reliable ( = 0.87), with mean of 0.08 and standard
deviation of 0.18. It ranges from –0.80 to 0.83, covering nearly all
of the theoretically possible values. If E and E∗ are alternative (if
inevitably imperfect) measures of ethnocentrism, they should be
correlated with one another, and they are: Pearson r = 0.45.
In bothmeasures of ethnocentrismwe havemade use
of so far (E and E∗), the social groups that are the basis for
ethnocentric beliefs and feelings are defined by race (pop-
ular understandings of race, that is): white, black, Asian
American, and Hispanic American. Of course, this is not
the only way to partition the social world, and so not the
onlyway tomeasure ethnocentrism.Race is a good choice:
American politics and society have been organized in im-
portant ways around racial conflict from the very outset
(e.g., Burnham 1974; Myrdal 1944; Smith 1997), and folk
theories of race are widespread and consequential (e.g.,
Devine 1989; Hirschfeld 1996). But race is not the only
choice. Indeed, one of ethnocentrism’s distinctive features
is its versatility (e.g., Levinson 1949). Depending on cir-
cumstances, ingroup and outgroup might be defined by
religion, language, sex, occupation, nationality, andmore.
With this in mind, we took advantage of new items
appearing in the 2008 ANES to fashion a thirdmeasure of
ethnocentrism, this one based on religious differences.
Respondents were asked to rate Christians, Catholics,
Jews, Muslims, Hindus, and Atheists on the thermometer
scale. Elsewhere in the survey they were asked to report
their religious affiliation (if any). We combine the two
sets of questions to create a measure of ethnocentrism
based on religion, E∗R.14 When we estimate the effect of
ethnocentrism on ratings of Obama with ethnocentrism
based on religion, we find very much the same result as
when ethnocentrism is based on race (see column 5 of
Table 2).
In short, the effect of ethnocentrism on opposition to
Obama in 2008 seems to be real. The effect is significant
and substantial across alternative measures and different
specifications. To many white voters, Obama appeared as
an outsider, and as such, unworthy of the nation’s highest
office.15
14Religious identification was coded using V083188x. The mea-
sure is unfortunately limited to respondents identifying as Protes-
tants, Catholics, and Jews. The number of Muslims and Hin-
dus was too small in the 2008 ANES to permit even rudimen-
tary analysis, and the survey did not include a category for
self-identifying as Atheist. The feeling thermometer variables are
V058064c (Catholics); V085064f (Jews); V085065e (Muslims);
V085065f (Hindus); V085065g (Christians); and V085065h (Athe-
ists). Ethnocentrismbased on religious difference,E∗R, is correlated
with E∗ (Pearson r = 0.36) and with E (Pearson r = 0.32).
15In our conceptualization, ethnocentrism entails ingroup solidar-
ity and outgroup animosity. If this is really so, then the effects of
ethnocentrism on opposition to Obama that we have documented
so far should reflect both attachment to ingroup and disdain for
outgroup. To find out if this is so, we repeated the baseline model,
but first we broke the ethnocentrism scale into two separate com-
ponents, one pertaining to the ingroup and the other pertaining
to outgroups. The results offer clear support for our understand-
ing of ethnocentrism. In particular, the results indicate that both
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Ethnocentrism, Racism, and
Religious Intolerance
Among the ways that Obama was seen as different, no
doubt the most conspicuous was race. When Obama’s
victory in 2008 was celebrated as historic, it was the elec-
tion of a black man to the presidency that was taken
to be the reason. The morning after the election, the
New York Times announced that Obama had succeeded
in “sweeping away the last racial barrier in American
politics with ease” (Nagourney 2008). To Henry Louis
Gates, Jr., Obama’s election was “a magical transforma-
tive moment . . . the symbolic culmination of the black
freedom struggle, the grand achievement of a great col-
lective dream (Gates 2009, 2, 3). Obama’s rise to promi-
nence and power requires us to consider the relationship
between ethnocentrism, on the one hand, and racism, on
the other.
Ethnocentrism and racism are related, but they are
not the same. Ethnocentrism is broader. Ethnocentrism
is a reaction to outsiders in general. The condescension
or disdain that the ethnocentric feels applies to strangers
of all varieties. Racism, in contrast, is condescension or
resentment directed toward a single and particular group.
Racism is both an expression of, and a justification for,
a set of specific practices of exclusion and oppression
directed at African Americans, from slavery on. Ethno-
centrism is a universal human appetite; racism is part of
American history.
Ethnocentrism and racism are not the same, but they
are related. In particular, we argue that they are causally
related. Ethnocentrism is a general readiness to partition
the world into allies and adversaries, a way of looking at
the social world that paves the way to racism. Putting the
same point in a different way, the appeal of any particular
prejudice will be greater if a person is already ethnocen-
trically predisposed. Prejudice of any kind, and racism
in particular, is all the more comfortable, all the more
satisfying, and all the more sensible for someone given to
ethnocentrism. Such a person is
. . . prepared to reject groups with which he has
never had contact; his approach to a new and
ingroup pride and outgroup hostility make significant contribu-
tions to dislike of Obama. The effect of ingroup pride is negative,
sizable, and statistically significant: the more virtuous whites con-
sider their ingroup to be, the cooler they feel toward Obama (b =
–20.73, s.e. = 5.52, p< 0.001). The effect of outgroup hostility is
negative, sizable, and statistically significant as well: the less virtue
whites attribute on average to black, Hispanic, and Asian Ameri-
cans, the cooler they feel toward Obama (b = –37.16, s.e. = 6.08,
p< 0.001).
strange person or culture is not one of curiosity,
interest, and receptivity but rather one of doubt
and rejection. The feeling of difference is trans-
formed into a sense of threat and an attitude of
hostility. The new group easily becomes an out-
group. (Adorno et al. 1950, 149)
If this is right—if ethnocentrism enables and motivates
racism—then certain empirical consequences follow.
First of all, we should find that ethnocentrism and
racism are related but distinct, correlated but not iden-
tical. To find out if this is so, we made use of a mea-
sure of racial resentment included in the 2008 ANES.16
Racial resentment presumes the existence of differences
between whites and blacks in achievement and status and
explains those differences as due to deficiencies in black
culture. Racial resentment is especially concerned with
black Americans’ individualistic shortcomings. From this
point of view, blacks fail todisplay the virtues of hardwork
and self-sacrifice that white Americans claim as central to
the moral ordering of their own lives and to the life of
their society. As expected, racial resentment, defined this
way, and ethnocentrism (E) are related (Pearson r= 0.30,
p< 0.01).
A second observable implication of our claim that
ethnocentrism is a cause of racism is this: if we add
racism to the standard model, the estimated effect due
to ethnocentrism on opposition to Obama should di-
minish. The effect should diminish, but it should not
disappear. Obama was an outsider—was seen as an
outsider—for reasons in addition to race. And, although
Obama’s campaign could not avoid race—Obama em-
bodied blackness—it did the next best thing, which was
to attempt to neutralize it. By and large, Obama did not
talk about race; did not go out of his way to seek the en-
dorsement of prominent black leaders; spent most of his
time in front of white audiences; and avoided the rhetoric
of racial grievance and compensation. Throughout the
campaign, race “was the thing always present, the thing
so rarely mentioned” (Remnick 2008, 83; for a good ac-
count of the 2008 campaign, see Balz and Johnson 2009).
Accordingly, racial resentment should explain some, but
not all, of ethnocentrism’s effect on Obama’s ratings.
The relevant results appear in Table 3. They show,
first of all, that racism has a strong independent effect
on opposition to Obama, consistent with research on the
2008 election (e.g., Lewis-Beck, Tien, and Nadeau 2010;
16On the meaning and measurement of racial resentment, see
Kinder and Sanders (1996). We use the standard ANES measure of
racial resentment (V085143–V085146). The reliability of the ad-
ditive scale, given by Cronbach’s alpha, is 0.77. The scale ranges
from −1 (not resentful) to 1 (resentful).
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TABLE 3 Ethnocentrism, Racism, and Religious
Intolerance
Baseline Baseline Model+ Baseline
Baseline Model+ Anti-Muslim Model+ Both
ANES Model Resentment Sentiment Mediators
Ethnocentrism −27.36∗∗∗ −14.68∗∗∗ −11.07∗∗ −2.22
5.16 5.10 5.21 5.13





Ethnocentrism 1.53∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 0.27
0.19 0.20 0.20 0.21




Top panel: Table entry is the OLS coefficient with standard error below.
Bottom panel: Table entry is the probit coefficient with standard error below.
Models control for partisanship, policy positions, assessment of national economic con-
ditions, education, political information, sex, and assessment of household economic
conditions.
Top panel: Dependent variable ranges from 0 (cold toward Obama) to 100 (warm).
Bottom panel: Dependent variable takes values of 0 (voted for Obama) or 1 (voted for
McCain).
*p< 0.1, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
Source: 2008 American National Election Study and 2008 Cooperative Campaign Analysis
Project.
Pasek et al. 2009; Piston 2010; Tesler and Sears 2010).
Table 3 also shows that, with racism held constant, the
direct effect of ethnocentrism is cut roughly in half.
These findings support our interpretation. Ethnocen-
trism leads to racism. Racism, in turn, motivates oppo-
sition to Obama. Obama triggers ethnocentrism partly,
but not entirely, for reasons of race.17
Next to race, the most prominent aspect of Obama’s
otherness had to do with religion. During the 2008 cam-
paign, many Americans came to believe that Obama was
Muslim. Never mind that Obama identified as a Chris-
tian; that he wrote movingly about his personal search
for Christ; that he chose to be baptized in Trinity United
Church of Christ in Chicago; that he attended services
there regularly; that he was married in Trinity United;
and that his two children were baptized there. No matter:
in November of 2008, at the close of the presidential cam-
paign, significant proportions of white voters—27.2% by
one estimate—believed Obama was Muslim. And many
moremay have had an unconscious or unverbalized belief
that Obama was a religious outsider.18
17Sample size is kept consistent across the models in Table 3 to
facilitate comparison of results.
18This according to the November wave of the 2008–09 Ameri-
can National Election Panel Study. Just 6.8% of black Americans
thought that ObamawasMuslim. These figures are similar to those
reported by other polls (Fox News, Pew, Princeton Survey Research
Associates). When other polls provide an explicit “Don’t Know”
option, sizable proportions of Americans decline to state Obama’s
In this context, religious intolerance, more specif-
ically, anti-Muslim sentiment, ought to work the same
way in 2008 as racism did. This means, first of all, that
ethnocentrism and dislike of Muslims ought to be cor-
related. Conveniently for our purposes, Muslims were
among some 25 groups included as part of the 2008ANES
thermometer scale. White Americans were cool toward
Muslims, giving them an average score of 49.9. By com-
parison, Christians received an average rating of 75.2. Of
the full set of 25 groups, Muslims were rated above only
three: illegal immigrants, homosexuals, and atheists. As
expected, this simple measure of attitude toward Mus-
lims is correlated with ethnocentrism (Pearson r = 0.36,
p< 0.01).19
If, as we suspect, opposition to Obama rooted in
ethnocentrism was a product, in part, of the mistaken
but widespread belief that he was or might have been
Muslim, then when we add a measure of anti-Muslim
sentiment to our standard model, we should see roughly
the same thing happen with religious intolerance as we
saw with racial intolerance. Table 3 indicates that we do.
First of all, dislike of Muslims powerfully predicts op-
position to Obama (consistent with results reported by
Tesler and Sears 2010). Second, with religious intoler-
ance held constant, the direct effect of ethnocentrism is
sharply reduced—in this instance, by more than half. In
direct parallel to the case of race, the results on religion are
consistent with the conclusion that ethnocentrism leads
to anti-Muslim sentiment; that anti-Muslim sentiment
generates opposition to Obama; and that Obama triggers
ethnocentrism in 2008 partly, but not entirely, for reasons
of religion.
What happens when both religious and racial intol-
erance are taken into account? These results appear in the
final column of Table 3. As indicated there, anti-Muslim
and antiblack sentiments each contribute significantly
and substantially toopposition toObama.Moreover,with
religious intolerance and racial intolerance held constant,
the direct effect of ethnocentrism disappears entirely.20
religious background, and doubts about Obama’s Christianity are
likely harbored there. Conscious belief that Obama is a Muslim is
not a necessary condition for anti-Muslim sentiment to be activated
in evaluations of Obama; priming can be most effective when the
perceiver is unaware of what is being primed.
19TheMuslim thermometer scale rating is V085065e.We coded the
variable to range from −1 (very warm) to 1 (very cold). For more
on the meaning of anti-Muslim sentiment, see Kalkan, Layman,
and Uslaner (2009).
20Put more formally, racial and religious intolerance together me-
diate the effect of ethnocentrism on opposition to Obama. We
conducted a formal test of mediation using the Sobel test with two
mediators (MacKinnon2008). The Sobel test for eachof jmediators
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This extremely tidy pattern of results, based on our
analysis of the ANES, is replicated in fine detail when we
turn to the CCAP.21 The replication results appear in the
bottom panel of Table 3. What we found to be true in
ANES, we find to be equally true in CCAP.
We conclude that Obama was marked as different
in 2008 in two principal ways: by his race and by his
(imagined) religion.
Activation of Ethnocentrism
Ethnocentrism is a deep and abiding habit. But this does
not mean that ethnocentrism is an inevitable feature of
political life. On the contrary, the part played by ethno-
centrism in politics is variable, contingent on circum-
stance. Candidates, issues, and problems come and go,
and they often come and go rapidly. Meanwhile, the car-
rying capacity of citizens and institutions is distinctly
limited. At any single moment, only a few topics can be-
come the center of a society’s attention. And only some
such topics that manage to command public attention
lend themselves to ethnocentric thinking. Ethnocentrism
is more likely to be activated insofar as there is close
correspondence—a “good fit”—between ethnocentrism,
on the one hand, and what is taking place in politics that
commands attention, on the other. By correspondence
we mean primarily that the events or issues or appeals
that happen to occupy center stage in political life lend
themselves to an ethnocentric point of view. Fit improves,
and activation is more likely, when politics is portrayed as
conflict between ingroups and outgroups—between the
virtuous and alien.
In previouswork, we showed that political events and
issues canactivate ethnocentrism(Kinder andKam2009).
Such activation often requires some rhetorical frame to
focus the ethnocentric lens on the issue, to direct citizens
on how to connect distinctions between the ingroup and
outgroup with a policy opinion. The ethnocentric lens
focuses easily and readily upon differences that can be
is conducted using the following formula: tj = aj∗bj/(bj2∗saj2 +
aj2∗sbj2)0.5, where aj represents the OLS regression coefficient for
E on each mediator j, bj represents the OLS regression coefficient
for each mediator j on evaluations of Obama, and s are the re-
spective standard errors. Using the values from the regressions esti-
mated in theANES2008, tresentment =–5.86,which yields p< 0.0001,
suggesting statistically significant mediation. Similarly, calculating
t anti-Muslims = –6.56, which yields p< 0.0001, also suggesting statis-
tically significant mediation. The same results appear for CCAP.
21We measure Racial Resentment with scap70–73,  = 0.86. We
measure anti-Muslim sentiment with response to a 5-point ques-
tion about favorability toward Muslims (ocap300mus).
simply and clearly observed and comprehended, and, we
argue, candidate characteristics—particularly those that
are easily observable or comprehensible—fit particularly
well into this criteria.
With ethnocentrism in mind, then, the 2008 election
was unusual. In 2008, one of the major party candidates
was marked by difference. Obama was black, and he was,
to a surprising number of Americans,Muslim. Indeed, he
was the embodiment of otherness. If this is right, and if
we are right to claim that the potency of ethnocentrism
depends on circumstance, then ethnocentrism should not
simply matter in 2008, it should mattermore in 2008.
More compared to what? It is at this point that we
exploit the great advantageof theAmericanNationalElec-
tion Studies: the provision of continuity and comparabil-
ity in the study of American national elections. In every
presidential year since 1952, ANES respondents are in-
terviewed before the election and once again afterward,
questioned each time in person by a professional inter-
viewer. Each year, adults of voting age are selected into
ANES studies through comparable probability sampling
designs. And of crucial importance for our project, the
standard ethnocentrism scale, E, was included not only
in the 2008 American National Election Study, but also
in the four preceding presidential ANES studies as well.
This permits us to compare the effect of ethnocentrism in
2008 to the effect of ethnocentrism undermore orthodox
conditions.
Table 4 reports the results of comparable vote mod-
els estimated separately for each of the five most re-
cent American presidential elections: Bill Clinton’s vic-
tory over George H. W. Bush in 1992; Clinton’s defeat of
Robert Dole in 1996; George W. Bush’s paper-thin vic-
tory over Al Gore in 2000; Bush’s defeat of John Kerry in
2004; and Barack Obama’s victory over John McCain in
2008. Every election is, of course, unusual in some degree.
But with respect to the activation of ethnocentrism, we
say that 2008 stands alone, and that for the purposes of
an empirical test, the four presidential elections that im-
mediately precede 2008 provide an adequate comparison
set.22
22All variables are constructed and coded to be as similar as pos-
sible to the 2008 analyses. For example, for Policy Positions, the
same four issues (spending and services, defense, health insur-
ance, and guaranteed jobs) are used across all years. In 2000, we
use only those respondents who were administered the 7-point
issue questions, to preserve comparability across elections. The
measure of ethnocentrism is based upon the stereotype battery,
with some variation in the fine details. In 2004 and 2000, E is
based upon stereotypes of four groups (whites, blacks, Asians,
and Hispanics) evaluated along three traits (hardworking/lazy; in-
telligent/unintelligent; not trustworthy/trustworthy). In 1996, E
is based upon the same three traits, but only three groups are
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TABLE 4 The Activation of Ethnocentrism in 2008
Vote Choice 2008 2004 2000 1996 1992
(GOP vs. DEM) McCain/Obama Bush/Kerry Bush/Gore Dole/Clinton Bush Sr./Clinton
Ethnocentrism 2.52∗∗∗ 0.27 0.68 –0.52 1.56∗∗
0.86 1.03 0.99 0.70 0.67
Partisanship −3.15∗∗∗ −3.23∗∗∗ −3.22∗∗∗ −2.86∗∗∗ −2.94∗∗∗
0.23 0.28 0.29 0.21 0.20
Policy Positions −1.42∗∗∗ −1.91∗∗∗ −1.46∗∗∗ −2.35∗∗∗ −1.64∗∗∗
0.32 0.48 0.49 0.42 0.37
Assessment of National 0.80∗ 1.22∗∗∗ −0.54∗ −2.03∗∗∗ 1.44∗∗∗
Economic Conditions 0.44 0.32 0.31 0.40 0.34
Education −0.19 −0.62 −2.45∗∗ 1.33 −0.40
0.96 1.18 1.19 0.89 0.85
Awareness 0.29 −1.17∗ −0.65 −1.07∗∗ −0.70
0.33 0.60 0.55 0.53 0.46
Female 0.41∗ 0.26 −0.31 −0.33 0.33
0.23 0.30 0.29 0.23 0.22
Assessment of Household –0.08 0.48∗ 0.20 −0.41∗ 0.21
Economic Conditions 0.19 0.27 0.32 0.23 0.22
Intercept 0.26 1.38 2.59 –0.33 0.86
0.82 0.97 1.02 0.78 0.72
lnL −605.67 −389.05 −380.60 −604.44 −726.33
p> 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 909 654 560 943 1093
Table entry is the MNL coefficient with standard error below.
∗p< 0.1, ∗∗p< 0.05, ∗∗∗p< 0.01.
Full results are available in the online appendix.
Source: 1992–2008 American National Election Studies.
Table 4 shows that, as expected, ethnocentrismplayed
an important part in the 2008 election—but not else-
where. The effect of ethnocentrism on the vote is effec-
tively zero in 1996, 2000, and 2004. Against expectations,
the effect of ethnocentrism is statistically significant in
1992, though, consistent with expectations, smaller than
the effect in 2008. Altogether, these results support the
general proposition that the activation of ethnocentrism
depends on the political circumstances of the times.23
evaluated (evaluations of Asians were not included in the survey).
In 1992, E is based upon stereotypes of all four groups, evaluated
along three traits (hardworking/lazy; intelligent/unintelligent; vio-
lent/peaceful). Full results (predicting abstention) from the MNL
models are available in the online appendix.
23Is the effect of ethnocentrism in 2008 statistically distinguishable
from its effects in previous years? In every case but one, yes. The
difference in the effect of ethnocentrism on the vote in 2008 versus
2004 (one-tailed p< 0.08); versus 2000 (one-tailed p< 0.09); ver-
sus 1996 (one-tailed p< 0.01); and versus 1992 (p∼0.41). In mag-
nitude, the effect of a change in E from –0.5 to +0.7 corresponds
with substantial declines in predicted support for the Democratic
candidate. In 2008, the predicted support shifts from 0.54 to 0.12.
A second and distinct test of activation takes ad-
vantage of the 2008 Democratic nomination contest.
Recall that Senator Clinton entered the season as the
presumptive nominee. She enjoyed the backing of her
party, an experienced and professional staff, endorse-
ments from prominent African Americans, money to
burn, and widespread public support. In a tight and
fiercely contested race, it was Obama who eventually
emerged victorious, of course, but in the early spring
of 2008 the outcome was far from clear.
Hence it made perfect sense for respondents in the
March wave of the CCAP to be asked about two hypo-
thetical races: one between McCain and Obama (should
Obama turn out to be the Democratic nominee) and
the other between McCain and Clinton (should Clinton
prove victorious). InMarch, both contestswere hypothet-
ical but both were realistic. Comparing the importance
of ethnocentrism across the two allows us to test activa-
tion while holding important factors constant: the state
In 2004, 2000, and 1996, the effects are quite small. In 1992, the
effect is sizable but smaller (from 0.58 to 0.24).
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TABLE 5 The Activation of Ethnocentrism by
Obama, not Clinton
Prefer McCain Prefer McCain





Policy Positions −0.87∗∗∗ −0.82∗∗∗
0.05 0.05
Assessment of National 0.57∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗







Assessment of Household −0.11∗∗ 0.07




p> 2 0.00 0.00
N 6269 6269
Table entry is the probit coefficient with standard error below.
Dependent variable is coded as 0 (prefer Democratic candidate)
and 1 (prefer McCain).
∗p< 0.1, ∗∗p< 0.05, ∗∗∗p< 0.01.
Source: 2008 Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project.
of the economy, the ongoing war, and the identity of the
Republican opponent.
Perhaps this is a hard test for us, since, after all, Sen-
ator Clinton—Hillary Clinton—embodied another di-
mension of otherness through her sex. Perhaps ethnocen-
trism ought to be directed toward her as well as Obama.
However, in priorwork (Kinder andKam2009),we found
that ethnocentrism is not activated in the domain of gen-
der, possibly because women as a broad social grouping
are less susceptible to demonization than other social
categories such as race, religion, and sexual preference.
Hence, we suspect that the ethnocentrism effect will be
directed toward Obama, not Clinton.
And this is what we find. Table 5 provides estimates
of the effect of ethnocentrism in each of two hypothetical
matchups. In column 1, we see the familiar result: in
the contest between McCain and Obama, ethnocentrism
stands out as very important. In column 2, the familiar
result disappears: in the contest between McCain and
Clinton, ethnocentrism has no effect at all.
FIGURE 3 Ethnocentrism and Support for the
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Source: 2008 Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project.
That said, was Obama helped or hurt by ethnocen-
trism? This question may seem odd. Up to this point, we
have concentrated on ethnocentrism as a force working
against Obama. Yet, it is entirely possible that voters who
reject ethnocentrismmight have been especially attracted
to Obama. Figure 3 shows that Obama does indeed pick
up support (relative towhat Clintonwould have received)
among the small proportion of white voters who score
below –0.05 on the ethnocentrism scale and loses support
(relative to what Clinton would have received) among
those who score –0.05 or above on the ethnocentrism
scale (roughly 82% of the sample).24 On balance, ethno-
centrismhurts rather than helpsObama, since the former
are vastly outnumbered by the latter.
In short, the part played by ethnocentrism in
American politics can be large or small, depending on
conditions. Candidate characteristics, we say, can be a
particularly clear and powerful means of triggering eth-
nocentrism. By virtue of Obama’s otherness—his race
and his imagined religion—the conditions were right in
2008. Ethnocentrism was activated. Obama paid a price.
Conclusion
Ethnocentrism is a deep-seated habit of thinking that par-
titions the world into ingroups and outgroups—into “us”
and “them.” Defined this way, ethnocentrism is pervasive
24In the predicted probability computations, we set Female to 1 and
other values to their sample means.
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in the United States and around the world. Previous re-
search has established that Americans differ from one
another in their level of ethnocentrism and that this dif-
ference has important consequences for the positions they
take on a wide range of government policies (Kinder and
Kam 2009). Here we investigated whether ethnocentrism
might also have an important part to play in American
presidential elections, selecting the 2008 contest, and the
candidacy of Barack Obama, as a likely case in point.
As we suspected it would, ethnocentrism emerged
from our analysis as a potent short-term force in 2008.
Faced with a choice between John McCain and Barack
Obama, voters were swayed by the usual and familiar play
of factors—party identification, views on policy, the state
of the economy—but also by one unusual and unfamiliar
factor: ethnocentrism. The effect of ethnocentrism on
the white vote was significant, substantial, and robust.
Many voters looked at Barack Obama in 2008 and saw an
outsider, a black man committed to a strange religion.
Ethnocentrism is a deep-seated habit, but the part
it plays in politics is contingent on circumstance. By
virtueof his race and religious convictions,Obama turned
the 2008 American presidential election into an excep-
tional case, one that activated ethnocentric sentiments
powerfully.
We do not mean to suggest that only candidate char-
acteristics can trigger ethnocentrism. Indeed, in prior
work (Kinder and Kam 2009) we showed that political
events and policy framing can activate ethnocentrism
across a range of policy domains. Candidates, parties,
and interest groups have various ways to signal alignment
with and opposition to various social groups: by propos-
ing particular policies that visibly favor some groups at
the expense of others; by emphasizing or neglecting prob-
lems that are of special concern to a particular group; by
keeping certain company, spending time in the public eye
with iconic representatives of one group or another; and
more.
We may have stumbled upon one such case our-
selves. Contrary to expectation, we found an effect of
ethnocentrism in the 1992 presidential election, albeit
a modest one. Perhaps this finding is a reflection of
the unusually strident Republican National Convention
of that year, which featured a declaration of a “culture
war” against homosexuals, abortionists, and immigrants.
While we think the most effective signal of all is mem-
bership itself (perceived membership, we should say), as
in Barack Obama’s racial background and religious faith,
we should bemindful that there are other ways to activate
ethnocentrism.
Given all the evidence we have marshaled here, the
reader might well be thinking: but Obama won. How
could this be, if ethnocentrism intruded so visibly and
consequentially in 2008? Good question.
Obama lost votes among whites due to his race and
his imagined religion, but other factors present in 2008
worked in his favor.25 For one thing, black turnout in-
creased sharply in 2008. From 1980 through 2004, blacks
made up 11% of the electorate. In 2008, this percentage
jumped to 13%. Because African Americans voted nearly
unanimously for Obama in 2008, the successful mobi-
lization of the black vote by the Obama campaign yielded
a rich harvest of votes, an increase in the popular vote of
about 2%.
More important still, national conditions favored the
Democrats overwhelmingly. Presidential elections are, in
very important part, a judgment of the incumbent party’s
performance in two domains: economic prosperity and
peace and security (e.g., Hibbs 2000; Rosenstone 1983).
With this in mind, consider John McCain’s predicament
in 2008. He found himself with two Herculean tasks: to
defend an increasingly unpopular war and to persuade
the country that it should trust the Republican Party to
fix the economic mess that it had apparently just created.
“Mess” understates things considerably. By the sum-
mer of 2008, energy prices were soaring, housing prices
were falling, and credit was drying up. Freddie Mac and
FannieMae, the twomortgage titans that together owned
or guaranteed roughly half the home loans of Ameri-
cans, teetered on the edge of collapse. Early in September,
Lehman Brothers went belly-up. Merrill Lynch was
bought by Bank of America, narrowly escaping a similar
fate. American International Group (AIG), the gigantic
insurance firm, was rescued by an 85 billion dollar gov-
ernment loan. Industrial production fell, unemployment
rose, and the stock market tumbled. The credit crisis was
spreading into the real economy and rippling through
Europe and Asia. As the election approached, American
confidence in the economy plunged to a record low.
This cascade of terrible news played directly into
Obama’s hands. Plausible models of presidential elec-
tions, ones that take into account in reasonable ways eco-
nomic conditions and peace and security, predicted a
landslide for the Democrats in 2008. Obama in fact won
53.7% of the vote; the models say Obama “should” have
won close to 60%of the vote. Themodels imply that if the
timing had gone a little differently, if the surge in Iraq had
begun a bit earlier and especially if the great recession and
the collapse of major financial institutions had not begun
until after the first week in November, Obama would not
have been elected at all.
25This interpretation of the 2008 election is taken from Kinder and
Dale-Riddle (2011).
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As things turned out, of course, Obama was elected.
Our point here is that he was elected despite ethnocen-
trism. Race and religion entered into the 2008 election in
a significant way. Only the dismal and frightening con-
ditions that surrounded the election, which were widely
blamed on Republicans, kept the election in the Demo-
cratic column.
The 2008 election provided unusually fertile grounds
for the activation of ethnocentrism. On the idea that
we would rather see election outcomes decided by ideas
and results and character than by intolerance, prejudice,
and ethnocentrism, wemight take some consolation over
2008’s seeming exceptionalism. Perhaps, but there is an-
other way to look at it. The 2008 election was unusual,
one might say, because the stable two-party system that
has characterized American politics for so long generally
protects against the selection of outsiders as presidential
candidates. Candidates like Obama are rarely nominated.
Over the sweep of American history, only one black per-
son has run for president at the head of a major party;
no women; only three Catholics; no Muslims (despite
what a significant fraction of the American public con-
tinues to believe); no Jews; no Atheists; no Latinos; no
Asian Americans; no (uncloseted) gays. Looking over the
full set of presidential candidates reminds us that in some
important respects, theUnited States remains an exclusive
political community—a reflection, we would suggest, of
the power and persistence of ethnocentrism.
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